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A b strac t
This paper analyses the intertem poral public finance decision under political 
instability. The government’s choice between inflationary finance and foreign 
debt is constrained by an interest rate, which is affected both by market con­
ditions and debt conditionality. The main result is th a t there is typically a 
trade-off between seigniorage taxation and foreign debt. There are two impli­
cations. First, m onetary and fiscal stability can typically not be achieved at 
the same time. Second, myopic behaviour produced by political instability leads 
to a reduction of seigniorage, not to an increase as argued, for instance, by 
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (AER, 1992).
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1 Introduction
Public finance decisions in many developing and transition countries are and were often 
plagued by three political economy problems which reinforce one another. First, foreign 
and domestic bondholders lose confidence in any form of bond issue and are no longer will­
ing to hold government debt. Second, loans on international credit markets are expensive 
or curtailed because of bad macroeconomic performance. International financial institu­
tions like the International M onetary Fund (IMF) apply conditions to their credits (debt 
conditionality). Third, given th a t existing tax  collection problems cannot be overcome in 
the short run, there is typically pressure on the government to use seigniorage for financing 
government expenses.
On top of these obstacles, public finance decisions are typically also affected by more directly 
political considerations. In particular, political instability is known to produce myopic 
behaviour by the government in power. There are two types of related literatures. The 
first one is about re-election chances and the government’s short term  measures to influence 
them .1 The other type either simply ignores the electoral process or argues th a t elections are 
not appropriate for modelling the country-specific situation.2 In this case, the incumbent 
government also highly discounts the future in favour of short term  gains.3 More cynically, 
one could say th a t the government tries to secure the spoils at least for the foreseeable future.
1 This is the argument of the traditional political business cycle literature (e.g. Nordhaus, 1975) as 
well as the modern (endogenous) political instability literature where the instability originates in electoral 
uncertainty (e.g. Tabellini and Alesina, 1990).
2 The insurrection literature (e.g. Grossman, 1991) captures the exogenous or endogenous probability of 
uprisings. Closely related is the literature on exogenous political instability: the government also faces an 
exogenous chance of losing power. Real world examples include the threat of a coup d ’etat or revolution as 
well as some unforeseeable event such as the terrorist attack in Spain prior to the elections in March 2004.
3 In Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), for instance, the government prefers the immediate benefit 
from seigniorage to the longer term  effects of structural change. In Devereux and Wen (1998) the result is 
more public spending at the expense of economic growth. Svensson’s (1998) model produces a low level of 
property rights investment, which hampers private investment in the future. In Bohn (2005) the government 
reduces public investment due to  various forms of political instability. In Bohn (2000) the government goes 
for high levels of seigniorage, even though international institutions apply debt conditionality on monetary 
stability, thereby providing less foreign debt.
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Political uncertainty without elections often occurs in more or less authoritarian developing 
countries with a high degree of social or ethnic heterogeneity (henceforth polarisation).
This paper analyses the intertem poral public finance decision under exogenous political un­
certainty and exogenous polarisation. The government finance decision is constrained by 
the aforementioned absence of domestic debt and the inability to change either tax  base 
or tax  rate. Public goods are financed by three sources of government revenue: a given 
proportional tax, seigniorage and foreign debt. The amount of available debt is determined 
by an interest rate, which is affected both by market conditions and debt conditionality. In 
this setup, the optimal choice of the government exhibits a trade-off between inflationary 
finance and foreign debt. M onetary and fiscal stability can typically not be achieved at the 
same time. The main mechanism is th a t political instability increases an incumbent gov­
ernm ent’s effective discount rate for future periods and hence reduces its concern for future 
debt repayment obligations. Even though the interest rate is endogenous, it is typically 
optimal to increase government debt and reduce seigniorage, when political instability goes 
up. This paper, therefore, contradicts Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini’s (1992) as well 
as Bohn (2000) who find th a t political instability leads to more seigniorage.
This paper extends the existing literature in two respects. First, it provides a more com­
prehensive view of alternative sources of government revenue. Cukierman, Edwards and 
Tabellini (1992) model seigniorage and taxation, Devereux and Wen (1998) capture domes­
tic debt and taxation, and in Svensson’s (1998) model there is only taxation. In contrast, 
this paper captures three alternative sources of government revenue. In particular, the 
model in this paper includes foreign debt because foreign debt is a crucial source of rev­
enue in developing countries with inherent (exogenous) political instability. Second, this 
paper emphasises the importance of the intertem poral setup. In Bohn (2000), international 
financial institutions give credits in response to previous period m onetary stability (ex ante 
debt conditionality). The government tries to comply in order to benefit from foreign debt 
in the future. However, increased myopia due to more political instability means more
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heavily discounted future benefits. Hence the government prefers high levels of seigniorage 
now while accepting less credits being made available by international financial institutions 
in the future. In Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), the mechanism is similar. 
More instability means th a t seigniorage now is more appreciated and a tax  reform affecting 
future revenue will be valued less (especially in a polarised society where the other govern­
ment has other priorities). Here, however, the situation is different. Foreign credits depend 
on contemporaneous debt conditionality. Myopia produced by political instability reduces 
the perceived burden of debt repayment and the government wants to borrow as much as 
possible. This can be exploited by the government by reducing seigniorage. Therefore, 
the findings here contradict those in Bohn (2000) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini 
(1992).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the intertem poral 
framework of the theoretical model. Section 3 summarises and simplifies the government 
maximisation problem. Section 4 discusses the impact of political instability and debt 
conditionality. Section 5 concludes.
2 The M odel
The model captures the intertem poral decision problem of the government, in particular 
the optimal choice between revenue from debt and inflation tax. It consists of two periods: 
period 1 (current period) and period 2 (final period). There are two sectors in the economy:
(i) the government and (ii) the private sector. The model is specified in real terms.
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Government Preferences and Political Instability
Government preferences over periods 1 and 2 are given by the following to tal utility (or 
welfare) function:
W  =  V1(C1) +  H l(G l, F i ) +  E {p (V2(C2) +  H 2(G2, F2))} . (1)
The V.(^) functions are concave and twice continuously differentiable utility functions of 
the government in private sector consumption C  (henceforth private consumption utility). 
The H.(^) functions are utility functions in the government provision of public goods G 
and F  (henceforth public goods utility). E  is the expectation operator and p <  1 is the 
government discount factor. Total government utility is additively separable in two senses: 
first, with respect to periods; and second, with respect to utility derived either from private 
consumption or from public goods provision.
Assuming two types of governments4 political instability comprises two features: (i) the 
probability of government change and (ii) political polarization. After the first period the 
incumbent government may lose office to the other set of policymakers with a fixed proba­
bility n; it stays in power with probability (1 — n ).5 It is assumed th a t there are two ethnic 
or social groups. Each one benefits more from one of the two public goods. Each of the two 
types of government provides both types of public goods, but to differing degrees. Political 
polarization then depends on the differences of policymakers’ preferences with respect to
4 Their objectives are basically identical. They only differ in tha t the two types of policymakers (symmet­
rically) provide different amounts of two public goods (or support two group interests to different degrees). 
In fact, the chance of another government with opposite objectives taking over in the next period is what 
produces the political instability and hence myopic behaviour.
5 In a multi-period setting, this random change of government at fixed intervals would be referred to as 
Markov switching (or Markov chain). If several time periods were considered and their lengths were fixed, 
for instance, at six months, some governments would only be in power for half a year, fewer would last for 
a year, and fewer yet for any longer period of time. This is a simple way of describing government change, 
but it matches the situation in many developing or transitional countries. In Russia, for instance, there 
were 5 changes of government in 1998 and 1999 despite the fact tha t no Duma or presidential elections were 
held. President Yeltsin alternately replaced representatives of the nomenclature (Chernomyrdin, Primakov, 
Putin) with so-called reformist Prime Ministers (Kiriyenko, Stepashin) in arbitrary and irregular intervals.
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their public good provision. The public goods utility function H  is specified for one type of 
government (for the other type, a  must be replaced by (1 — a)):
For simplicity, their disagreement in public goods provision is parameterized symmetrically 
by a  which is exogenous. The denominator in equation (2) is a normalization such tha t
have identical preferences; the more distant a  is from half, the more they disagree on
types are very dissimilar, political polarization is large. Political polarization measured 
by a  contributes to political instability because it accounts for the extent of preference 
changes given a change in government. For a  equals half, the political instability effect of a 
government change is eliminated.
Budget Constraints
The government budget constraints for both model periods (1 and 2) are:
(2)
H (G ,F ) =  F  +  G = : X, (3)
where X  is the to tal public goods provision and the marginal public goods utility H '(X ) 
equals unity (cf. section 3 and appendix A). W ithout limiting the general validity of the 
analysis, it is assumed th a t 1 >  a  >  2,. W hen a  equals half, the two types of government
how much to spend on each of the two public goods. If preferences of both  policymaker
Gi +  Fi <  tY  +  S i +  D. (4)
G2 +  F2 +  (1 +  r)D  < tY  +  S2
Real government expenditure consists of consumptive spending only (except for debt re­
payment in period 2). F 1, G 1, F2 and G2 are the amounts chosen by the government to
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spent on the two types of public goods in both periods. There are three sources of gov­
ernment revenue (right hand side). The focus is on the alternative choice of debt versus 
inflation taxation. Seigniorage is a government instrum ent both in period 1, S 1, as well as 
in period 2 , S2. At the same time, the government can choose to borrow on international 
credit markets in period 1, but has to repay its debt D, which is done in the final period 
(so th a t the model is closed). If the government discount factor p in equation (1) equalled 
the international discount factor, 1+ ,  the government would always want to increase debt 
under political instability because there is a chance th a t another government would have to 
repay the debt. However, r  is endogenous (as discussed further down) and the government 
is, therefore, price constrained in its choice of D. Following the parsimonious model notion, 
ordinary taxation is modelled at a rudim entary level only. It is calculated from exogenous 
tax  rate t  and exogenous tax  base F . 6
The private sector budget constraints for both periods are simply:
C 1 <  (1 — t  )Y  — S 1 — y (S1). (5)
C2 <  (1 — t  )Y — S2 — y (S2).
Each period real private consumption depends on real income net of non-distortionary taxes 
minus inflation taxation and its deadweight loss y . The function y is assumed to be rising 
and convex in seigniorage (y' >  0, y'' >  0). Intuitively, this is a reasonable (though not 
compelling) assumption because the marginal increase in seigniorage at a higher level of 
seigniorage is typically associated with a more substantial rise in inflation compared to the 
rise of inflation at a lower level of seigniorage (Cagan, 1956).7 For simplicity, it is assumed 
th a t y is the same in both periods, but this has no bearing on the results.
6 This implies two simplifying assumptions: (i) this is a no growth economy; and (ii) the tax rate cannot 
be changed. It also implies tha t taxes are non-distortionary.
7 Direct welfare costs include the shoe leather, the Olivera-Tanzi and redistribution effects. It suffices 
tha t the overall effect of inflation on welfare costs are linear, it may even be slightly concave. In developing 
and transition economies the effect of inflation on welfare costs is, however, more likely to be convex because 
high levels of inflation typically also erode the trust of the private sector in using the national currency for
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The model could be interpreted in per capita terms, but the private sector is passive in the 
sense th a t it cannot take optimizing decisions on labor, savings or investment. Thus, there 
is no income growth and the two private sector budget constraints are not directly linked 
intertemporally. W ith regard to the privat sector budget constraint the model is similar to 
the model in Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992).
Debt and Debt Conditionality
Debt conditionality could be modelled to be purely quantity-constrained, if we assumed a 
to tal loss of a country’s credit-worthiness with commercial lenders. Then the IMF would 
lend a certain amount of funds depending on some performance criteria. In this paper, 
however, a broader view is taken. It is assumed th a t the country in question has full access 
to international credit markets. There is no debt ceiling; instead, debt is price-constrained: 
the more the country wants to borrow, the higher the interest rate. In addition, international 
financial institutions still exert some influence. If they withdraw (part of) their credits 
because the country fails to fulfill certain debt conditionality criteria, the interest rate rises, 
but the country is still able to borrow from commercial lenders.
The willingness of international financial institutions like the IMF or the World Bank to lend 
depends on criteria referred to as debt conditionality. The aim is not only to avoid default 
and ensure repayment; instead debt conditionality is typically motivated by more general 
considerations such as economic and political stability or long run growth. In this paper, two 
performance criteria (Ray, 1998) as employed by the IMF (Guitian, 1995) are used: (i) deficit 
to GDP ratio (deficit reduction criterion); and (ii) money supply growth (M , monetary 
stability criterion). As GDP equals exogenous income here, the GDP ratio criterion (i)
transactions. Thereby, the levels of barter trade and currency substitution in the economy are raised. 
Thus welfare losses are caused by seigniorage directly as well as through its effect on barter and currency 
substitution. Barter has been a problem in many developing and transition countries, in particular in 
Russia, and currency substitution was a wide-spread problem, for instance, in Eastern European as well as 
Latin American countries.
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reduces to deficit (equal to debt D in this model). As for the m onetary stability criterion (ii) 
we derive the following relationship between S and M  from the quantity equation (M  * V =  
Y * P , V being velocity) together with the definition of real seigniorage (S =  M =  H  p ) 
and the exogeneity of Y in the first period: S =  M Y. Instead of basing the criterion on the 
money supply growth rate, it can also be based on seigniorage S (while acknowledging th a t 
fluctuations in V can affect S).
Endogenous Interest Rate
While incorporating both  commercial and institutional lenders, the interest rate equation 
remains fairly general:
r  =  Z(D, 0(D , Si,£, a)) =  ^ (D , S i,£ , a). (6)
The Z function distinguishes between the positive impact of an increase of the quantity of 
debt on the interest rate and the equally positive effect of debt conditionality function 0 , 
where 8 and a  represent IMF conditionalities with respect to deficit (which corresponds to 
debt D in this 2-period model) and inflation (which is measured by seigniorage in period 1, 
Si). Most of the following assumptions on equation (6) are straightforward:
(i) -0 fc >  0 , where k == D, S1, i, a
(ii) ^DD > °
(iii) ^SiSi >  0 or (1 -
VV
 -
V
(iv) ^DSi =  -0 SiD >  °
(v) ^DS >  0 and ^Sia > 0 ,
(vi) =  0 and ^SiS =  0 ,
(7)
<  fa iS i <  0 ,
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Raising debt D, seigniorage S1 or debt conditionalities 7  and 8 leads to an increase in the 
interest rate - as described by (i). Assumption (ii) reflects the dominant direct effect of D 
on the interest rate: at high levels of D, the interest rate explodes. Unsustainable levels of 
debt lead to prohibitive interest rates. Assumption (iii) refers to the second derivative with 
respect to S1. It may be negative, but must be above some threshold (where ¡3 refers to 
political uncertainty and polarisation as discussed in section 3) to ensure th a t our govern­
ment decision problem is a well-defined maximisation problem. One could have also made 
an argument for a direct effect of S1 in Z along the lines of assumption (ii). Assumption 
(iv) says th a t the cross-derivatives should, obviously, be non-negative. Assumptions (v) and 
(vi) reflect the idea of a conditionality, which means th a t the marginal effect of D (S1) on 
the interest rate is increased by a rise in its respective conditionality factor 8 (a), but there 
are no cross-effects.
Even though the interest rate rises with reduced m onetary (S1 >  0) and fiscal (D >  0) 
stability, strategic default or debt renegotiations are not envisaged. There are three reasons 
for not incorporating either of them  in the model: (i), from a conceptual point of view, the 
focus of the paper is on the choice between debt and seigniorage under political instability, 
not on the strategic game between the government and the international community (which 
is also interesting, but another paper); (ii), from a methodological point of view, it is difficult 
to capture both  political instability and default in one and the same model (analytical 
results of a 2-period model would certainly not be possible); and (iii), empirically, default 
is much less relevant than  commonly thought. According to International Development 
Association and International M onetary Fund (IDA and IMF, 2001) the incidence of recent 
debt rescheduling was only 12 percent in the group of some 60 countries which do not belong 
to the HIPC group (so-called heavily indebted poor countries).
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3 G overnm ent P roblem  and Technical C om plications
The government maximization problem and its solution are not straightforward for two 
reasons: (i) there is a time-inconsistency problem; and (ii) there are too many instruments. 
The time-inconsistency problem arises because the uncertainty about which government is 
in power is resolved before the government decides about seigniorage S2 and public goods 
F2, G2 in the second period. Hence the government would have to reoptimise, if this 
were not taken into account. Therefore, the solution involves backward induction and the 
government optimisation in the first period is constrained by the optimal decision taken by 
any government in period 2.
Instruments and Public Goods Utility
Nonetheless, it is instructive to start by reviewing the maximisation problem in the first 
period as if there were no time-inconsistency problem: the government maximises total 
utility function (1) subject to constraints (4) and (5). The government has two types of 
instrum ents at its disposal: (i) its revenue choice between seigniorage and debt (S1, S2, D); 
and (ii) its decision on public spending on each of the two public goods in both periods 
(F1, G 1, F2, G2). Increasing this period’s revenue and spending it on public goods in period 
1 raises contemporaneous public goods utility H . If the increase in revenue is due to an 
increase in period 1 seigniorage, government utility derived from private sector consumption 
is reduced at the same time. If it is paid for by more credits, the additional debt has to 
be repaid based on the going interest rate in period 2, which reduces funds available for 
public goods in period 2 and hence decreases utility derived from them. Credits and the 
intertem poral distribution of public goods spending are determined -  inter alia -  by the 
effective discount factor which also includes the effect of political instability as shown in 
equation (10) further down.
Equation (2), which refers to the specific (though quite sensible) assumption on public
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utility H , has three specific implications. First, the optimal distribution of the total public 
goods spending between F  and G is crosswise symmetrical for both  types, say i and k, of 
governments (when in power). Second, government utility H  derived from type i ’s choice of 
F  and G (when in power) is equal to government utility derived from type k ’s choice (when 
in power):
H * (G , F") =  Gi +  F i =  X i =  X  =  X k =  Gk +  F k =  H k(Gk, F k). (8)
Third, the (real) to tal value of public goods spending H  is normalised -  for each government
-  by the sum of its arguments (F + G ), when chosen optimally by any incumbent government. 
(The marginal utility of public goods spending is unity.) For i and k representing different 
governments and a  >  2 being assumed (without loss of generality), note, however, th a t 
government k ’s optimal choice for F  and G is, of course, suboptimal for government i: 
X" =  H "(G \ F ") >  H"(Gk, F k) =  ^ X ".
Government Utility Simplified
On this basis8, the government utility function (1), can be simplified. For each period 
separately, utility derived from private consumption and from public goods spending is 
considered for the government in power in period 1 only. Superscripts are only used for the 
other government (marked by k). In period 1, this government’s optimal choice for F  and 
G results in H (G 1, F 1) =  X 1. Thus first period utility is
V(C1) +  H (G 1, F 1) =  V(C1) +  X 1 (9)
If this government is still in power in period 2 (with probability (1 — n)), it will choose F  
and G such th a t H (G 2,F 2) =  X 2. If, however, this government loses power in period 2
8 We also use two other earlier assumptions: (i), public goods spending F  and G does not appear in the 
private sector budget constraints (5); and (ii), government objective function (1) is additively separable.
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(with probability n), it has to put up with the public goods spending chosen by the other 
government, i.e. H (G k, F | ) =  1-a X 2. Hence its second period to tal expected utility is:
E  { p ( V(C2) +  H (G2, F2) )} (10)
=  p ( ( 1  — n) (V(C2) +  X 2) +  n (V(C2) +  ^ ^ 0^ X 2) )
=  p ( V(C2) +  ^ (a ,n )X 2 )
Thus government utility in period 2 depends on the effective discount factor which comprises 
three exogenous parameters: discount factor p, political polarisation a  and the probability of 
losing power n. The la tter two param eters are subsumed under quasi-exogenous param eter 
¡3, which is to represent political instability:
1 a
0 < ¡3(a ,n )  =  (1 — n) +  n -------  <  1. (11)
a
Note th a t political instability augments the effect of the discount factor: it lowers the 
valuation for the second period, i.e. it increases government myopia. Obviously, ¡3 =  1 if 
both  governments have identical preferences (a  =  2) or if the government stays in power 
with certainty (n =  0). For a  = 1  and n =  1, ¡3 =  0. In other words, ¡3 decreases with 
more political diversity (polarisation a  t )  and /or more political uncertainty (probability of 
government change n t) .
Equations (9) and (10) show th a t total government utility does not depend on the optimal 
distribution of public goods spending between F  and G, but on its total amount. Nor does it 
depend on which government is in power. Nonetheless, the fact th a t there are two potential 
governments does have crucial implications for any government decision on the total amount 
of public goods spending as well as on credits and seigniorage, because political instability 
augments the discount factor. In fact, the model is constructed th a t way to allow for the 
analysis of political instability by itself (as, for instance, in Devereux and Wen, 1998, or
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Svensson, 1998) as opposed to analysing the effect of different types of government with 
different objectives (as, for instance, in Aghion and Bolton, 1990, or Tabellini and Alesina, 
1990).
Second Period Maximisation
Due to the time-inconsistency problem the second period maximisation problem must be 
solved first in order to obtain the overall solution:
^  V (C2) +  H j (F j ,G2) j  =  i ,k  (12)
s.t. (i) G2 +  F2 +  (1 +  r)D  <  tY  +  S2
(ii) C  <  (1 — t ) y  — S2 — 7 (S2).
As the uncertainty of who chooses F2 and G2 is resolved, the expectation operator on public 
sector utility H  vanishes. From equation (8) we know th a t both governments choose different 
levels of F2 and G2, but both governments’ choices result in the same level of public goods 
utility. Hence constraint (i) can be substituted in irrespective of the government in power. 
W ith constraint (ii) also substituted in, we obtain the identical maximisation problem for 
either government and hence the identical optimal choice for S2 (which could be used to 
solve the distribution problem by deriving H (G 2, F2) =  F2 +  G2 and hence F2 and G2). The 
first order condition (FOC) with respect to S2 for second period optimisation is:
(—1 — y'(S2)) V'(C2) +  1 =  0, (13)
which simply states for period 2 th a t the loss in marginal private consumption utility due to 
an increase in second period seigniorage must equal the gain in marginal public goods utility 
(which is unity according to equation (3)). Note th a t optimal second period seigniorage is 
independent from the first period choice for D and Si.
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First Period Maximisation
The period 1 revenue and expenditure problem of the government can now be specified on 
the basis of government preferences as stated in (1) and equations (9) and (10). Govern­
ment budget constraints (4) and private sector budget constraints (5) can be substituted 
into equations (9) and (10) for Ft +  Gt = : X t and Ct , t =  1, 2, respectively. Consider­
ing the solution for the second period (which enters as a A constraint), the fundamental 
maximisation problem is:
max V ( (1 — t )F  — S i — y (S i )) +  p V ( (1 — t)Y  — S2 — Y(S2)) (14)
+  ( tY  +  Si +  d )  +  p 3  ( tY  +  S2 — (1 +  ^ )D )
+  A ((—1 — y'(S2)) V'(C2) +  1 )
We obtain three first order conditions, with respect to Si, D and A. The la tter corresponds 
to the aforementioned FOC derived from the maximisation in period 2 (equation 13). The 
other two are:
(—1 — y'(S i )) V '(C i) +  1 — p 3 ^ sx =  0 (15)
1 — p3(1  +  ^ )  — p3 D ^ D =  0
The first FOC requires th a t the marginal gain in public goods utility due to a marginal 
increase in first period seigniorage (which is unity due to the assumption made in equation 2) 
equals the marginal disutility of reduced first period private consumption plus the marginal 
disutility of discounted second period public consumption (which depends on the reaction 
of interest rate r  on increased first period seigniorage, ). The second FOC equates the 
marginal gain in public goods utility in period 1 due to a marginal increase in debt (which is 
unity) with its discounted disutility in period 2. The la tter consists of two effects, a volume
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effect of increased D (which is (1 +  ^ )p 3 ) and a price effect depending on the reaction of 
interest rate r  on marginally increased debt D, ^ D. Note th a t the discount factor is p 3 , i.e. 
it includes the impact of political instability.
4 R esults
FOCs help to understand the mechanisms of the model and provide some prim a facie un­
derstanding of effects, but they do not capture any feedback effects. The rest of the formal 
solution is technical and will only be sketched out here. Two more steps are required. First, 
FOCs are, of course, only the necessary conditions. The sufficient condition for a maximum 
is th a t the determ inant of the Bordered Hessian of (14) must be positive. Finally, we want 
to characterize the impact of marginal changes of exogenous param eters on optimal values 
for government instruments. In the following, perturbation results are obtained for the four 
exogenous param eters of the model. The probability of government change n and political 
polarisation a  are subsumed by 3 , the political instability param eter, which was introduced 
in equation (10). Param eters 8 and a  indicate debt conditionality with respect to deficit and 
seigniorage, respectively. For all of these, perturbation results can be obtained, for instance, 
by deriving to tal differentials and using the Cramer Rule. There is no impact on second 
period seigniorage of any of the exogenous parameters, because second period optimisation 
is completely separate as derived in equation (13). For debt and first period seigniorage the 
results are as follows.
Political Instability
First, we are interested in the effect of political instability 3  on the optimal government 
choice of debt and seigniorage in period 1. Remember th a t both the probability of govern­
ment change n and political polarization a  are negatively related to 3 , which takes values 
between 0 (complete political instability) and 1 (perfect political stability). Applying total
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differentials leads to the following perturbation result, which holds at the equilibrium.
P rop osition  1 (P o litica l In stab ility )
The impact of increased political instability (lower 3 ) on debt and first period seigniorage 
depends on the specific functional form at of the interest rate equation (as well as the func­
tional form at of private sector utility in period 1). For ^ Sl >  0, but small, we obtain the 
following “normal reaction”:9
(i) §  <  0.
(u) §■ >  0
Increased political instability means th a t the second period is less valued. Debt is now a 
less costly source of revenue than  seigniorage. Additional debt can be afforded because 
repayment in the second period is less likely, i.e. the second period is discounted more 
heavily. Given th a t there is more revenue now, it is optimal to reduce seigniorage in order 
to reduce the negative effect of seigniorage and its deadweight loss on private sector utility.
There are three effects on the second period government budget constraint, two price and 
a quantity effect. On the one hand, more debt in period 1 increases the interest rate and 
implies higher levels of debt repayment. On the other hand, less seigniorage has a partly 
offsetting effect through its dampening impact on the interest rate. A “normal reaction” 
means th a t the la tter effect does not dominate the other two. Overall, the burden on the 
second period government budget constraint is, therefore, increased. “Normal reaction” 
always implies th a t the level of debt increases.
This “normal reaction” is likely to occur, even if ^ Sl >  0 and large. However, an “abnormal 
reaction” cannot be excluded. Perturbation results based on general functional formats are 
too complex to give a clear analytical answer. Nonetheless, not much would be gained by
9 Confer appendix B for a sufficient condition and for the result, when Si does not affect the interest 
rate (in violation of assumptions 7).
17
producing an “abnormal reaction” in a simulation exercise. The logic is clear and is outlined 
in the following.
Suppose the effect of S i on the interest rate were large. Then it would be optimal for the 
government to choose a low level of first period seigniorage irrespective of the existing degree 
of political instability. W hen political instability increases (lower 3), it is less costly for the 
government to strain the public budget in the second period. Under specific functional 
formats and param eter constellations, the optimal way of exploiting this may be to produce 
an increased interest rate by raising the level of seigniorage while reducing the level of 
debt. The la tter has 2 effects. It reduces the debt repayment and has a dampening effect 
on the interest rate, thereby (partly) offsetting the increase caused by the higher level of 
seigniorage.
However, first period public goods utility is only increased, if the increase in seigniorage 
is larger than  the reduction in debt. Then, under specific constellations, the welfare gain 
from increased first period public revenue may outweigh the loss caused by the increase 
in seigniorage. The loss includes: (i) the effect of higher seigniorage on the reduction of 
first period private sector utility; and (ii) the net effect of the first period public revenue 
composition on second period public goods utility (which comprises the aforementioned two 
price and one quantity effects on debt repayment as discussed in the previous paragraph).10 
The “abnormal reaction” seems highly constructed, but is theoretically possible.
Discussion: The main result of this paper is the aforementioned “normal reaction” for the 
trade-off between debt and seigniorage. This paper confirms the standard result of political 
instability producing myopic behaviour. However, it contradicts the finding th a t the myopia 
results in more seigniorage. T hat result was obtained in Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini 
(1992), where the government chooses to finance its budget with more inflationary finance 
while postponing structural reform. It was also obtained in Bohn (2000), where the govern­
10 Second period private sector utility will not be affected, because the optimal choice of second period 
seigniorage does not depend on first period instruments as discussed in section 3
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ment responds to debt conditionality based on monetary stability by limiting inflationary 
finance this period in order to be eligible for higher levels of international credits next period. 
In this paper, there are debt conditionalities based on seigniorage as well as debt. These 
conditionalities are modelled as contemporaneous links. The model reveals a trade-off be­
tween fiscal and monetary conditionality: myopia produced by political instability typically 
leads to less seigniorage and more debt.
Debt Conditionality
Here, we are interested in the effect of debt conditionalities a  and 8 (based on seigniorage 
and deficit, respectively) on the optimal government choice of debt and seigniorage in period 
1. For both  conditionalities, we consider the case where an increase in a  or 8 translates into 
a higher interest rate charged for credits. However, the functional format remains general. 
Applying to tal differentials leads to the following perturbation result, which holds at the 
equilibrium.
P rop osition  2 (D eb t C on d ition alities)
(i) d~ t  <  0 .
(ii) ^  >  0
(iii) §  <  °.
(iv) >  0
The impact of increased debt conditionalites (higher a, higher 8) on debt and first period 
seigniorage is as expected: conditionality on itself leads to a reduction, conditionality on 
the alternative source of revenue produces an increase. The trade-off effect of the two 
conditionalities is confirmed. The findings indicate, therefore, th a t it may be difficult for 
international financial institutions to achieve both objectives, m onetary and fiscal stability, 
at the same time.
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5 C onclusion
This paper introduces a parsimonious framework for studying the problem of optimal govern­
ment finance under political instability. It is suited for analysing the case of most developing 
and some transition countries, where political instability is inherent to the political structure 
of the country rather than  caused by electoral uncertainty as in Western democracies. A 
country’s political situation is characterised by its uncertainty about government change and 
its political polarisation within society. Alternative means for financing government spend­
ing on public goods are considered: taxation, seigniorage, and foreign debt. The amount of 
available debt is determined by an interest rate, which is affected both  by market conditions 
and debt conditionality (the la tter being imposed by international financial institutions like 
the IMF).
Two main conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, political instability does lead to 
myopic government behaviour as argued in the literature. However, it is not optimal for the 
government to increase revenue by expanding seigniorage. This result contradicts earlier 
findings by Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and Bohn (2000). Contrary to these 
previous models, here, debt and seigniorage are alternative sources of current period gov­
ernment revenue.11 An increase in political instability leads to myopic behaviour, because 
there is a lower valuation of debt repayment obligations in the future. Hence the govern­
ment typically desires a higher level of debt. Total government revenue is increased while 
optimality requires a reduction of seigniorage.
The second conclusion deals with effects of debt conditionality. Conditionalities based on 
monetary and fiscal stability both reveal an im portant trade-off which arises from the fact 
th a t seigniorage and debt are alternative sources of current period government revenue. Debt 
Conditionality on debt leads to a reduction, debt conditionality on the alternative source 
of revenue produces an increase of debt. The trade-off effect of the two conditionalities is
11 In Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), foreign debt is ignored. Bohn (2000) only captures future 
foreign debt in response to the seigniorage decision in the current period.
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confirmed. These results cast doubt on the ferocity with which the IMF used to require 
debtor countries to achieve m onetary and fiscal stability at the same time. But our findings 
take us one step further: we can draw policy recommendations. According to the model, 
the trade-off between deficit reduction and m onetary consolidation can be avoided, if debt 
conditionality either refers to deficit or to seigniorage, but not to both. Which one to focus 
on depends on a judgement of the relative desirability of monetary versus fiscal stability 
objectives.
Future work on public finance under political instability and debt conditionality could go in 
various direction. The first one refers to work in progress. We are going to test empirically 
the effects of debt conditionality and political instability studied in previous theoretical 
papers. Preliminary work indicates th a t this is going to be a difficult task. While there 
is data  on political instability, data  capturing the link between interest rates and debt 
conditionality applied to individual countries is not readily available. Such empirical work 
might, however, help shed more light on the effectiveness of (previous) IMF policies.
As for theoretical work, a natural complement to this short run model is a long run perspec­
tive including, nonetheless, political instability. This could be done in an infinite horizon 
framework or, possibly, in a three-period model. Not only would additional time periods 
contribute to a more complex model structure, but a number of additional issues would have 
to be addressed, for instance: (i) how to include growth in the model and study its impact 
on political instability; (ii) how to incorporate a government tax  instrument; and (iii) how 
to include debt repayment in such a long run model. In a more extended framework th a t 
includes some of the above issues it might be conjectured th a t a certain initial level of po­
litical stability is required as a precondition for getting on a path  of recovery. We might, for 
instance, get a multiple equilibria story for optimal government behaviour under political 
instability similar to the one obtained by, for instance, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) for optimal 
rent-seeking behaviour.
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A p p e n d i x
A O ptim al P ublic G oods Spending
The following exposition draws on Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992). The same 
approach is also used in Svensson (1998). For convenience, polarisation assumption (2) which 
is embedded in the government utility function H  for public goods spending is restated for 
the type i government:
(A.1)
Since (A-1) contains a minimum function, optimality can only be achieved for
(1 -  a)F* =  aG*. (A.2)
As the utility function H  for the type k government is symmetrical according to its definition 
in section 2, so is the optimal distribution between F k and Gk: (1 — a )G k =  a F k.
Government i ’s optimal to tal public goods spending X * can be w ritten as
1 — a  a
(A.3)
By reinserting into utility function (A-1) the optimal values for F  and G in terms of X  
(G* =  (1 — a ) X F % =  a X *) a simple result for total public goods utility H  is obtained:
(A.4)
X* =  F l +  G \
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We can now see th a t the denominator in equation (A-1) was chosen as a normalisation such 
th a t the marginal public goods utility is unity. Furthermore, given th a t utility function 
(A-1) is symmetrical for both types of government, the optimal values for F  and G are 
crosswise identical (F* =  Gk and G* =  F k) and
H*(G*, F*) =  X * =  X  =  X k =  H k(Gk, F k). (A.5)
B Sufficient C ondition for P roposition  1
Sufficient conditions for the “normal reaction” stated  in proposition 1 are as follows:
For >  0, it suffices tha t
0 (D 0 d +  D 20 dd — 1 — 0 ) <  (1 +  0  +  ) (B.1)
Given th a t the right hand side is positive, a more restrictive sufficient condition is th a t 
either term  on the left hand side is smaller or equal to 0. =  0 is sufficient, but would 
violate assumption (7) (i). Alternatively, the following is sufficient:
+  D 2^ Dd — 1 — ^  <  0. (B.2)
For dD <  0, it suffices tha t
— p^ (^Si +  D^SiD ) D  ^ si
>  ' ( —Y 'V ' +  (1 — Y )V " )  — p^D ^SiSi] [1 +  ^  +  D ^ d ] (B.3)
The term  in the second square brackets on the right hand side is positive, whereas the one 
in the first square brackets is negative for ^ SlSl >  0. (The la tter term  is still likely to be 
negative, even if ^ SlSl turns negative as long as it remains within the limits prescribed by 
assumption (7) (iii)). Hence the condition is certainly fulfilled for ^ Sl =  0 and for ^ Sl >  0, 
but small. It may even be fulfilled for larger values of ^ Sl.
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